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A Plea for Logical Atavism"
Göran Sundholm
1. Jean van Heijenoort, and following him, Jaakko Hintikka, have pointed to a
cluster of distinctions that serve to identify some of the (Collingwoodian)
"absolute presuppositions" of 20th century logic.' These distinctions comprise,
among others:
LOGIC AS LANGUAGE VERSUS LOGIC AS CALCULUS
(i) Universal language versus many meta-perspectives;
(ii) Universal logical laws with content versus meta-linguistic laws
without content.
(iii) Formal system for proving theorems in versus formal systems for prov-
ing theorems about,
(iv) One fixed universe versus varying domains of discourse (Boole-
Schroder tradition).
My self-chosen office is that of counsel for the defence to Logical Atavism, a
position that is closely connected to the Van Heijenoort-Hintikka theme.
The Oxford fnglish dictionary (first edition) defines:
Atavism, [a. F. atavisme, f. L. aiav-us a great-grandfather's grandfather, an
ancestor; cf. av-us grandfather.) Resemblance of grandparents or more
remote ancestors rather than to parents; tendency to reproduce the ances-
tral type in animals or plants.
Who, then, are the ancestors of the present-day homo iogicusf Answering only
for myself, my immediale logical ancestors, that is, my Doktortäler, were meta-
logicians.'' The meta-logical paradigm, to which they, as well as the over-
* Text of an invited lecture a! LOGICA 2000. The material was also presented in Paris, March
13th. 2000, at an ÎHPST seminar, and I am indebted to J. Dubucs and F. Pataut for their kind invi-
tation. There is some overlap with other writings of mine, in particular [1998b] and [forthcoming
b]. Dr. Björn Jespersen (Leyden) read my penultimate draft and saved me from a number of splips.
1
 Van Heijenoort [1967], 11976]. Hintikka[ I9S8], [1996] prefers to recast the distinction in terms
of Language as the Universal Medium versus Language as Calculus.
2
 At Uppsala. Stig Kanger. one of the creators of the Beth-Hmtikka-Kanger-Schütte method of
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whelming majority of contemporary logicians, belong, was established only
after 1930 as a result of the fundamental contributions offered by Kurt Gôdel
and Alfred Tarski, and their masterly codification by Paul Bernays.J Prior to
this metamathematical shift, the foremost task of any "Symbolic Logician"
worth his salt was not to prove metamathematical theorems about forma! lan-
guages, metamathematically construed, but to provide a foundation for mathe-
matics in the following way:
(1) designing a sizeable formal language with an axiomatic deductive
apparaturs;
(2) providing careful meaning-explanations for its basic (or primitive)
notions;
(3) making the axioms and rules of inference evident form the meaning-
explanations in question,
such that
(4) the resulting framework is adequate (at least in principle) for real and
complex analysis.4
2. Our Founding Fathers, for sure, exhibit this pattern: in Frege, it is present
wholesale. The Grundgesetze, Vol. I, §§ 29-31, in particular, can be seen as
Frege's attempt to establish the adequacy of his meaning explanations.
Unfortunately, as we now know with the benefit of hindsight, his splendid
efforts fall foul of the Zermelo-Russell paradox. Controversy would have
ended, or perhaps better, would not even have begun, if his attempted execu-
tion of the above foundationalist programme had been successful. The
Grundlagen crisis would not have taken place. The alternatives offered by
Brouwer and Hubert would not have been canvassed and today we would all
have been devout Fregeans.
As it went, a decade after Frege had his life's work shattered by Russell('s
paradox), Whitehead and Russell completed the publication of their Principia
Mathematica, a massive, type-theoretical emendation of Frege's foundationa!
scheme in three volumes. Also they adhered to the above foundationalist
scheme. However, their attempted execution of the programme is flawed as was
proving completeness by means of applying the Gentzen sequent-calculus rules backwards and of
the "possible-worlds" approach to semantics for modal logic.
At Oxford, Dana Scott, with fundamental contributions to almost all branches of metamathemat-
ics. and Robin Gandy, an architect of the theory of the hyperarithmetical and analytical sets.
> Oodel [19311. Tarski [1935], Hilbert-Bernays [I93«9|.
* This framework, of course, is little but an adaptation to modern needs of the Aristotelian-
Euclidean paradigm as set out the Posterior Analytics. Scholz [1930] remains an excellent treat-
ment.
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speedily realized. Ramsey, in particular, stressed that three of their "axioms"
sail under that flag falsely, namely those of Infinity, Reducibility, and Choice
(under its Russellian guise as the "Multiplicative Axiom"): the Whitehead-
Russell explanations offered in Principia Mathematica simply fail to make evi-
dent the "axioms" in question. It is by no means clear that they are principles
'eines Beweises weder fähig noch bedürftig'.5 Russell and Whitehead mainly
drew on pragmatic utility-considerations in order to motivate the axiomatic sta-
tus of the controversial principles, very much along the same lines that Ernst
Zermelo had used in order to counter his adversaries in his polemical master-
piece |1908a]. Zermelo was clearly aware of the fact the his concomitant
axiomatization of set theory [ 1908b] does not constitute a foundation in the
sense of ( 1 ) - (4) above. His conception is postulational in the sense of Hubert,
but not Aristotelian-Euclidean in the sense of organized science according to
the Posterior Analytics. Zermelo begins by considering a domain ("Bereich") in
which the set-theoretical axioms hold and continues from there, after the fash-
ion of Hubert's work in geometry that he had witnessed at close range in
Göttingen.
Furthermore, as was famously noted by Gödel, from the point of view of
formal precision, Principia Mathematica presents 'a considerable step back-
wards as compared with Frege'.6 Indeed, owing to Russell's sloppiness in the
fundamental syntactic and meaning-explanatory parts of Volume I, it even
proved necessary for Whitehead to add a 'Prefatory Statement of Symbolic
Conventions' to Volume II.'
L. E. J. Brouwer's intuitionistic critique of classical reasoning in mathe-
matics, which began in his thesis [ 1907) and was made fully explicit in his brief
[ 1908], can, even though Brouwer was notoriously hostile to language, be seen
as offering another approach to the problem of content in the foundations of
mathematics. This line of thought was continued by his pupil Arend Heyting
around 1930. Points {1 ) - (4) are present in the foundational perspective gen-
erated by his meaning-explanations, possibly with some reservation about the
extent to which he succeeds in realizing (4).s
3. Both the Logicism of Frege, Russell and others, as well as the Intuitionism
of Brouwer, unambiguously fall within the foundationalist scheme. Formalism
under the guise of Hubert's Programme, on the other hand, can (best) be seen
as an attempt to circumvent the problem of missing content within
Foundations. Here only anodyne propositions {that are acceptable as con-
!
 Frege i 1884. §3. p. 4].
'GSdelil944, p. 126|.
' See Lowe 11985. p. 2921.
], [1930al,11930b],
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strucvtive by Kronecker and Brouwer alike) were officially held to be mean-
ingful. The rest of mathematical language was seen as a formalist game with
instrumental use only. Thus viewed Hubert's formalism constitutes an applica-
tion of the positivist slogan:
THE VERIFIABLE CONSEQUENCES CHECK OUT.
What, if anything, the higher ("ideal" in Hubert's terminology) mathemat-
ical language speaks about does not matter in the least, as long as everything
numerical that is derivable with its use can actually be derived without such
use. Finitistically secured consistency turns out to be enough to ensure that any
theorem with finitist content can actually be proved finitistically. In this fash-
ion, Hilbert transforms the extra-mathematical problem of a foundation for
mathematics into a mathematical problem, namely the mathematical problem
of proving finitistically that a certain formal system, say, for analysis, is con-
sistent. That such radical simplicity would appeal to mathematicians was a
foregone conclusion: in place of abstruse metaphysical deliberations, they are
offered a clear-cut mathematical problem to be solved. Again, as in the case of
Frege, there was hope for an Endlösung to the foundationat issues, and yet
again that hope was frustrated by means of a mathematical result.9
But for these well-known "mainstream" activities that fall within the tradi-
tional, though perhaps not wholly accurate Logicism/ Intuitionism/ Formalism
pattern, other efforts at saving Logicism were made; Carnap*s [1931] can be
seen as its last stand. By [ 1934] even he was prepared to jettison content and
adopt anodyne formalism. According to his principle of "Logical Tolerance"
'there are no morals in logic' and hence anything goes.
The Polish attempts at revision, restriction, or execution of logicist pro-
grammes were more promising. Leon Chwistek and Stanislaw Zaremba
(whose writings played a crucial role in stimulating the formalist, metamathe-
matical researches of Jaques Herbrand) are two important names here.10
However, the prize for the most formidable exponent of foundationalism after
Frege surely has to go to Stanislaw Lesniewski, in whose writings almost neu-
rotic levels of formal precision are reached. His penchant for absolute rigour
has not been surpassed throughout the history of logic. This definitive formal
work, which was published just before 1930, never caught on, though, owing to
the contiguous shift towards metamathematical work that was mentioned
above. Other logicians clearly found it more exciting to read and master the
novel meta-logical investigations of Gödel and Tarski rather than torturing
' In the case of Frege by means of the set-theoretical antinomies, and that of Zermelo-Russell in
particular, and in Hubert's case by means of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems 11931].
10
 Zaremba [1926] respectively Chwistek [ 1948] (where further references to his work are found).
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themselves by adhering to Lesniewski's "directives"." But for a small band of
devoted followers no one has paid much attention to his grandiloquent con-
structions, whereas it is clear that Lesniewski has much to offer concerning the
philosophy of logic. A Lesniewski revival is in my opinion long overdue. Surely
his work merits also gênerai, non-sectarian interest.
4. Zermelo [ 1930] constitutes a very interesting attempt at a foundation of
mathematics. There Zermelo gives an (almost) isomorphic characterization of
set theory in terms of full second-order logic. Whether this (almost) categori-
cal second-order (Hubert) postulate system can be seen also a real
(Aristotelian-Euclidean) axiomatization with content is a highly interesting
problem, and one that applies in even higher degree to Dedekind's second-
order characterizations of the naturals and real numbers. In other words:
DOES CATEOORICITY OF A SECOND-ORDER POSTULATE SYSTEM CONFER
CONTENT UPON ITS FORMAL LANGUAGE IN SUCH A FASHION THAT ITS
POSTULATES ARE THEREBY TURNED INTO SELF-EVIDENT AXIOMS?
An attempt at an answer must be left for another occasion.
Early American attempts at a logicist foundation, incorporating axioms
with content and classical logic, were made by Curry, Church, who used novel
formal calculi for the manipulation of functions. These efforts, and the some-
what later one by Quine, illustrate some of the dangers that are inherent in
foundational work of this kind, where one balances of the edge of the founda-
tional abyss. The constructional challenge posed by the foundational scheme is
quite difficult, demanding that one gets as much mathematics into the system
as possible with as weak a framework as possible. There is always the risk of
falling into the trap of overloading content and falling into inconsistency. The
above Americans did, for sure, but so did Frege.
By the end of World War II, the metamathematical paradigm was firmly
entrenched. The WFF's of a formal system do not have content but are merely
elements of a freely generated algebra over a suitable alphabet: metamathemat-
ical formal languages are not meant for use but for mention only. Sometimes,
indeed, the "object language" is left out entirely: it is not used for saying any-
thing, but only serves as a subject matter for the (meta)mathematical theorems.12
11
 Contributory factors in the neglect were also the facts that his papers are difficult to obtain (and
written in Polish). His premaiure death just prior to World War II and the ensuing destruction of
much unpublished material completed the rout. Perhaps with the appearance of [I992| matters
wilt be remedied ....
'
:
 Thus, the early presentations of Gödef's Theorem Mostowski 11952] and Feferman [1960]
directly work with the Oodel numbers: for instance, a "FREE VARIABLE" is a number, say of the form
29+4k, k - 0, 1, 2,..., and a "BOUND VARIABLE" is a number of the form 31+4A, k - 0, 1, 2,...* etc..
156 Göran Sundholrn
A particularly clear example of the shift in perspective and aims is offered by
the changing role of turnstile ' |—*: in early logical works it plays the role of an
"assertion sign", indicating that the theorem in question is known while proved.
Today, on the other hand, it is universally used a as "derivability" or "theorem
predicate" among the WFF's of a formal system.13
5. My atavistic position is now that we as logicians would do well to return not
to our immediate ancestors, but to pre-1930 days, when interpreted formal sys-
tems still held sway. What, if any, would the advantages of such a retrograde
step be? I list a few.
First, the object language is not longer useless, but its "expressions" will
also express. They are expressions in a real sense and have meaning. Linguistic
intuitions concerning grammar and meaning that are used derivatively, so to
say at second hand, in designing the formal semantics of metamathemaitcs
would now be used directly, at first hand, for formulating the syntactic struc-
ture of the language and for providing the required meaning-explanations. The
check on the adequacy of the formalism now rests in its use, rather than in the
reasonableness of its metamathematical semantics.
Second, a number of phenomena that tend to get ignored in metamathe-
matical treatments are easily taken care of. A prime example is that of asser-
toric force (treated by means of the Urieilsstrich, rather than the theorem pred-
icate) and other pragmatic notions. When Richard Montague, as distinguished
a representative of the Tarski metalogical school as any, treated of "pragmat-
ics" in eponymous papers, what he in fact did was to give a formal semantics
for demonstrative terms involving reference to a speaker, but nevertheless only
at the level of content. The use level remains untouched.14
Third, in metamathematical formalism the WFF's play a double role. In
current metamathematical treatments of logic, in particular, in systems of
Gentzen's Natural Deduction, both formation-rules and derivation-rules per-
tain to WFF's.15 Thus, they serve as formalistic simulacra of propositions, that
is, judgmental contents, since according to the syntactic formation-rules they
are the constituents out of which other more complex WFF's are built. On the
other hand, they also play the role of demonstrated ("asserted") theorems,
since WFF's serve as end-formulae of the derivation-trees. This conflation of
roles has led
Fourth, to a neglect of the distinction between (alethic) logical conse-
quence (that is, a relation between propositions) and (epistemic) inference
'
J
 Stepanians [1998, chs. 1-5| tel!s the exciting story of the Fregean assertion sign. KJeene [1952.
p. 88, p. 526] documents its use as a theorem predicate.
" For instance, Montague 11970J.
l!
 In my | I998a) and [2000] I deal with the semantic interpretation of natural deduction deriva-
tion trees.
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(that is, an act of passage between theorems). For instance, one way to look at
the entailment connective of "relevance logic" is that it propositionalizes the
secondary relation that holds between the propositions that serve as contents of,
respectively, the premise-judgement and conclusion-judgement of a {one
premise) valid inference.16
Fifth, also the important semantic notion of presupposition is readily
accommodated. For instance, definite descriptions are dealt with as follows:
(3!jteind)AU) is true
(ixsInd)A(j) eind B(JT) is a proposition, provided that xelnd
B((ixeInd)A(x)) is a proposition.17
Here we have, contra Wittgenstein's Tractatus 2.0211, an example of how
whether one proposition, namely B((weInd)A(jr)), has sense, does depend on
whether another proposition, namely (3!xelnd)A(;c), is true.
6. Finally, what, if any, atavistic treatments oflogic are there today? To the best
of my knowledge there are only two serious alternatives here. On the classical
side there is TIL, Transparent Intensional Logic, the impressive creation of the
late Pavel Tichy, which has been explored and enriched by the tireless work of
Pavel Materna [ 1998] and his Czech, Danish, and Finnish co-workers. Tichy's
atavism is cast in the shape of a type theory, using partial functions and classi-
cal logic. The resulting type-structure is richer than the standard one, say, of
Montague grammar, owing to the presence of further ground-types and a large
number of logico-linguistic phenomena have been dealt with successfully. I
wish to deny neither the power of the TIL-machineery nor its flexibility; in my
[2000a] I have, however, set out a number of reasons for doubting that it wil!
actually run. The basic assumptions of the framework are very strong indeed
and, in my opinion, they have not been made sufficiently clear as yet.
That leaves the intuitionistic type theory of Per Martin-Lof [1984J as the
sole remaining atavistic alternative known to me. Its linguistic potential is at
least as impressive as that of Tichy's TIL, as has been amply shown in the
works of Aarne Ranta.1* Its versatility in the philosophy oflogic I have attempt-
" I have treated of the conflation between consequence and inference in (1998], j
[forthcoming a], where a treatment or the semantic interpretation of natural deduction and of the
notion of assumption can also be found.
" Stenlund (1973] contains a beautiful treatment of presuppositions along these äines. Ind here
indicates the relevant type of individuals, whereas the exclamation-mark in the existential quantifi-
er indicates uniqueness.
" Ranta 11994] and many subsequent writings.
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ed to document in treatments of, for example, identity, inference, and the the-
ory of truth.19 Martin-Lof himself in a number of works has explored the philo-
sophical perspective of his theory within metaphysics and ontology20, episte-
mology21 and verifcationism,22 meaning-theory and semantics.23 However, I
labour under no illusion that these lists, no matter how long or impressive I
could make them, will serve to gain proselytes for logical atavism. The only way
to become convinced of the virtues of logical atavism is to practice it, by exper-
imenting with fomal languages having content. The type theory is a system in
use, with meaning. There is no substitute for honest work in order to learn for
oneself how thoroughly natural such a system is. Therefore:
ATAVISTS OF ALL NATIONS, UNITE!
RETURN TO CONTENT!
Göran Sundholm
University of Leiden
Filosofisch Instituut
P.O.Box 9515
NL-2300 RA Leiden
The Netherlands
b.gsundholm@let.leidenuniv.nl
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